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In 2003, US officials identified several human monkey-
pox cases and traced the virus exposure to infected captive
prairie dogs. The virus was likely introduced through a ship-
ment of imported African rodents, which were kept with
other mammals, including prairie dogs, in a pet distribution
facility in the Midwest. To prevent the further introduction
and spread of the virus, federal agencies restricted the
importation of African rodents and restricted the domestic
trade or movement of prairie dogs and certain other
rodents. In this qualitative assessment of the risk for mon-
keypox associated with the 2003 outbreak, we conclude
that the probability of further human infection is low; the risk
is further mitigated by rodent import restrictions. Were this
zoonotic disease to become established domestically, the
public health effects could be substantial.
I
n May and June 2003, public health officials identified
an outbreak of human monkeypox in the United States
(1–3). This was the first instance of human monkeypox
virus (MPXV) infection detected outside its endemic range
in Africa (3). As of July 30, 2003, a total of 72 human cases
had been reported (4,5). Thirty-seven (51%) cases were
eventually laboratory confirmed, and 35 met the case def-
inition set by the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC) (4,5). Among the 35 patients whose
cases were laboratory confirmed before July 11, 2003 (1),
32 (91%) tested positive for MPXV by PCR, culture,
immunohistochemical testing, or electron microscopy of
skin lesions; 2 tested positive by PCR and/or culture of an
oropharyngeal or nasopharyngeal swab; and 1 tested posi-
tive by PCR and culture of a lymph node aspirate (1). To
date, no new animal or human cases have been reported.
The outbreak was relatively large compared with most
reported events in Africa, but clinical features were milder
than typically seen there (3,6,7). No human deaths
occurred (1,8), although 2 children required intensive care
(1,8). One patient received a corneal transplant due to
chronic ocular infection (8).
Most patients were exposed to prairie dogs, primarily
from an Illinois animal distributor (IL-1). Most of those
infected had direct physical contact with infected animals;
infection likely resulted from bites or scratches or through
open wounds (1–3). Some patients were exposed to prem-
ises where prairie dogs were kept (1).
Traceback implicated rodents from a shipment of
African animals imported to Texas on April 9, 2003, as the
probable source of MPXV (1,4). The shipment contained
≈800 small mammals of 9 different species, including 6
genera of African rodents (762 rodents total): rope squir-
rels, tree squirrels, Gambian giant rats, brushtail porcu-
pines, dormice, and striped mice (1,2), as well as
cusimanses, genets, and palm civets (9). Rodents from the
shipment were housed with or in close proximity to prairie
dogs at IL-1. Approximately 200 prairie dogs were at IL-1
coincident with the arrival of the imported African rodents
(1). Many prairie dogs from IL-1 were distributed to other
states for sale as pets (1,4). CDC traced 93 infected or
potentially infected prairie dogs from IL-1 (1). An addi-
tional, unknown number of prairie dogs died or were sold
at animal swap meets for which records are not available
(1) (Table 1).
To prevent the introduction and spread of infected ani-
mals into susceptible populations, on June 11, 2003, the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and CDC issued an
order that prohibited 1) importation of all rodents from
Africa and 2) transportation, sale, or any other commer-
cial or public distribution, including release into the envi-
ronment, of prairie dogs or rodents from 6 species
represented in the African shipment (10). On November 4,
Qualitative Assessment of Risk for
Monkeypox Associated with
Domestic Trade in Certain Animal
Species, United States 
Susan M. Bernard* and Steven A. Anderson*
Emerging Infectious Diseases • www.cdc.gov/eid • Vol. 12, No. 12, December 2006 1827
*US Food and Drug Administration, College Park, Maryland, USA2003, FDA and CDC published an interim final rule (11)
that imposed import restrictions on all African rodents and
established or modified restrictions on the import, cap-
ture, transport, sale, barter, exchange, distribution, and
release of prairie dogs, the 6 imported species, and possi-
bly, by order, other animals with the potential to transmit
MPXV. Neither CDC nor FDA exercised its statutory
authority to seize and destroy animals to prevent the
spread of MPXV.
We prepared this qualitative risk analysis to help under-
stand the impact of the domestic trade restrictions on the
current risk for human monkeypox infections. We evaluat-
ed the data and uncertainties concerning monkeypox and
its potential spread to animal and human populations and
characterized the probability of harm on the basis of those
data. Because of CDC’s import restrictions on all African
rodents, we did not estimate the risk posed by importation
of animals into the United States. We focused only on
monkeypox and did not consider other zoonotic agents that
might be transmitted by the species discussed. This risk
assessment follows a generally accepted 4-part framework
(12). The hazards are MPXV and its potential for transmis-
sion and spread from animals to humans; the risk is human
infection from prairie dogs and possibly imported rodents.
Hazard Identification
Human monkeypox is a sporadic zoonotic viral disease,
caused by an orthopoxvirus that until 2003 was known to
have occurred only in parts of Africa (3,7,13). The first
human illness was identified in 1970 in a child (7,14).
Previous cases were likely mistaken for smallpox (14).
Although it was first isolated from a captive primate (3,6),
rodents are its likely primary natural reservoir (7,15–17);
its complete mammalian host range is unknown. The mode
of transmission between infected animals and humans is
not well defined (18). Direct mucocutaneous contact and
respiratory routes have been implicated in epidemiologic
and experimental research (15,18,19).
The estimated mean human incubation period is 12
days (1,3,15,16). The disease is characterized by a rash
similar to that observed with smallpox (14) or chickenpox
(10,15,20). The infectious period occurs during the first
week of the rash (7); symptoms include headache, fever,
sweats, and severe lymphadenopathy (15,16,20). Among
African patients with a history of smallpox vaccination,
monkeypox is usually milder with lower numbers of
deaths (3,6,16). Subclinical or very mild infection can
occur in humans (16,21,22).
Case-fatality rates in African outbreaks range from 4%
to 33% (6,23) and are high among children (3,6,14,23).
Variability in case-fatality rates may reflect incomplete
assessment of the total number of cases, variations in case
definition, and variability in the virulence of MPXV
strains. The US outbreak has been associated with a milder
strain (3,24–26). Case fatality also likely depends on dif-
ferences in exposure, susceptibility, and healthcare (14).
Repeated animal reintroduction of MPXV is believed
necessary to endemic infections in human populations.
Human cases in disease-endemic areas tend to be sporadic
and isolated and primarily associated with direct animal-
to-human transmission (24,27). However, clusters associ-
ated with common source and human-to-human
transmission occur and may in Africa be increasing with
decreased prevalence of prior smallpox vaccination
(6,7,15,16,28,29).
FDA has not approved a treatment for monkeypox.
Suggested treatment options include cidofovir (30–32).
Efficacy of vaccinia immune globulin in humans has not
been established (30,31). After the onset of symptoms,
supportive therapy is usually the recommended treatment
(31). Preexposure and postexposure smallpox vaccine was
used during the 2003 outbreak, with only relatively minor
adverse events reported (1,32).
Hazard Characterization
Much is unknown about pathogenesis and transmission
dynamics of MPXV in humans and animals. Limited
research suggests that at least in some host mammals latent
or inapparent infection occurs (15). In addition to serolog-
ic evidence of orthopoxvirus exposure, MPXV has been
recovered from the kidneys of healthy-appearing animals
(15,16). The latency period is unknown, as is whether the
virus can be transmitted during such periods.
The complete host range of MPXV in Africa is
unknown. Animal antibody surveys in disease-endemic
areas suggest infection is enzootic among squirrels, other
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infected (6,15,16,33–35).
The number of animals exposed or infected in the
United States is unknown and impossible to estimate.
Approximately 800 animals were recorded in the African
shipment, but disposition information is available only for
rodents (Table 1) (1). A Gambian giant pouched rat, 3
dormice, and 2 rope squirrels from the shipment were test-
ed and found to be infected with MPXV (1). Infected ani-
mals from the shipment were housed or transported with
prairie dogs and other mammals. An unknown number of
prairie dogs and animals from other species became infect-
ed. Although many prairie dogs became ill and several
died, some infected animals survived. The secondary
attack rate among susceptible animals is unknown and can-
not be estimated with available data.
CDC necropsied 249 animals involved with the out-
break, confirming infection in 33 animals with PCR (36)
and in 22 animals through virus isolation from various tis-
sues. Infection was confirmed in 14 prairie dogs, 2
Gambian giant pouched rats, 9 dormice, 3 rope squirrels, 1
ground hog, 1 hedgehog, 1 jerboa, and 2 opossums.
CDC performed extensive histopathologic examination
on 2 necropsied prairie dogs from IL-1 and detected
MPXV DNAby using real-time PCR (18). The necropsied
prairie dogs had MPXV in saliva, lesion exudates, and
bronchi and lung parenchyma (18). Approximately 110 of
the ≈200 prairie dogs likely exposed at IL-1 were sold after
the African animals were introduced and before 15 of the
prairie dogs at IL-1 became ill. Ten of the ill prairie dogs
died rapidly (1,3,18).
In June 2003, CDC evaluated an unspecified number of
prairie dogs, dormice, hedgehogs, jerboas, opossums, and
numerous other species (a total of 18 species) from IL-1;
of these, 2 prairie dogs, 7 dormice, 1 African hedgehog, 1
jerboa, and 1 gray short-tailed opossum tested positive for
MPXV by PCR (36). When these animals were infected or
if they could transmit disease is not known.
On June 19, 2003, CDC acquired 61 live animals from
the original shipment. On August 20, 2003, CDC acquired
from the state of Illinois 291 animals remaining at IL-1,
including African and domestic species. Numerous other
animals were acquired from Iowa, Wisconsin, Indiana, and
Ohio. Of 172 animals tested from the various states as well
as from the original shipment, 25 showed serologic evi-
dence of infection without overt signs of disease (i.e., PCR
and tissue culture negative). On June 24, 2003, an oral and
ocular swab from a dormouse from IL-1 tested positive by
PCR. After the dormouse died a month later, its tissues
tested positive for MPXV by PCR and culture. A second
dormouse from IL-1 that also tested positive in June
appeared healthy; however, when it was euthanized in
December 2003, swabs and necropsy samples of various
tissues, urine, and feces were positive by PCR. No viral
antigen was detected on pathologic examination of tissues
(36).
Investigations of human cases from the outbreak sup-
port the hypothesis that close direct contact with infected
animals was necessary for infection. Cases occurred
among persons who were bitten by infected prairie dogs or
infected through open wounds (3,8). The 11 Wisconsin
patients included a child and parents; a meat distributor
who also distributed exotic animals; his wife; 2 employees
of 2 different pet stores; 2 veterinarians from different clin-
ics; a person who had bought prairie dogs; and that per-
son’s houseguest. All of these patients reported direct
contact with an infected prairie dog (3), although human-
to-human transmission could not be ruled out for the par-
ents (3).
Data on duration of infection are limited. Virus appears
to be present in some animals months after infection,
regardless of clinical illness. In addition to CDC’s data on
dormice, data derived from experimental infection of small
numbers of laboratory animals documented infectious
MPXV in tissues 3–6 weeks after exposure (18). Clinical
and asymptomatic infections have been reported among
captive primates; severity varied depending on the species
and route of inoculation (16). CDC has reported elevated
tissue viral loads in 2 necropsied prairie dogs (18). In
another study, 10 experimentally infected North American
ground squirrels died within 9 days, although no obvious
signs of disease except for lethargy and anorexia devel-
oped (37). Squirrels infected intranasally had a longer
incubation period and later death (36). Ten prairie dogs
infected experimentally with a human MPXV isolate were
highly susceptible to infection but had a lower death rate
and less severe pathologic change than were seen in the
squirrel study that used the same dose (19).
Ahuman adult infected during the 2003 outbreak expe-
rienced keratitis and corneal ulceration as a complication
of infection and ultimately received a corneal transplant
(8). Corneal ulceration has also been reported in some
African patients (16).
Exposure Assessment
In African outbreaks, capturing, handling, and eating
wild animals have been associated with infection
(6,23,34). In the United States, monkeypox occurred in
humans who had direct contact with infected animals and
were bitten or infected through open wounds (3). These
persons included pet dealers, pet owners and their children,
and contacts of these people at risk of coming into direct
contact with the infected animal. Although potential expo-
sure occurred in settings that included pet stores, swap
meets, and wild animal trade centers (1), no evidence
exists that persons casually exposed to infected animals
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are not well quantified. In 2002, ≈30,000 prairie dogs were
sold at pet dealers, swap meets, flea markets, and other
venues open to the public (11).
Of the 762 rodents in the African shipment, CDC traced
584 (77%) (1). The remaining 178 (≈23%) could not be
traced beyond the point of entry (1). The fate of the 50
nonrodent animals on the shipment is unknown. Of the
≈200 prairie dogs that may have been exposed to MPXV
at IL-1, 107 (54%) have not been accounted for. These ani-
mals will not likely be traced. A small number of animals
associated with the outbreak, including some known to
have been infected, are in the possession of pet dealers and
private owners; their capacity to transmit infection is
unknown. Animals from species other than the listed
species—gerbil, hamster, chinchilla, opossum, groundhog,
hedgehog, and jerboa—were discovered to be infected,
although no confirmed human cases of infection were
associated with contact with any animal except prairie
dogs (1,9).
To evaluate the potential spread of the disease beyond
the initially exposed animals, the US Geological Survey’s
National Wildlife Health Center trapped 237 small mam-
mals from 14 species at 9 sites in Wisconsin and Illinois
where cases of monkeypox were reported. All were nega-
tive for monkeypoxvirus or monkeypoxvirus-specific anti-
bodies (38). These small amounts of data are insufficient to
establish the absence of MPXV in the wild.
The federal restrictions on importation of high-risk
species and trade in the listed species have likely sub-
stantially reduced the potential risk for exposure of unin-
fected animals or persons to MPXV. However, some resid-
ual risk for MPXV infection through illegal importation or
infection in legally imported, nonlisted species may exist.
Risk Characterization
Table 2 provides summary information on the qualita-
tive variables considered in the risk characterization. We
evaluated the probability of human monkeypox infection
that resulted from certain types of exposure or contact
(direct or indirect) to animals (infected or noninfected) and
qualitatively estimated the probability and, to a lesser
extent, the possible severity of infection. Most confirmed
human cases in the United States were associated with
direct, close contact with infected prairie dogs. We charac-
terize as type I direct contact with the animal and as type
II direct contact that also involves bites, scratches, or other
contact with the mucous membranes or nonintact skin of
the affected person. Infection through aerosolized particles
without direct animal contact, or by some other less direct
method, as well as human-to-human transmission, cannot
be ruled out. The probability of infection is dependent on
whether the animal is infectious (shedding virus) and
varies with the level of shedding and the nature of
human–animal interactions (type, frequency, and duration
of contact). We assume, on the basis of the data described
above, that the primary means of transmission affecting
the risk would be from animal to human.
Several categories were established to define and qual-
itatively characterize the risks. Low risk denoted no direct
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infection status was unknown or the animal was infected,
the exposure to the animal was likely insufficient for ani-
mal-to-human disease transmission to occur. Medium risk
described human contact that was direct but the exposure
involved type I contact with a potentially infected animal
or animal(s) of unknown infectious status. High risk desig-
nated direct human contact and involved a type II contact
with a captive animal(s) infected with MPXV or with
unknown infection status but likely MPXV exposure.
Finally, the term severity of infection and illness denoted
any individual infection with MPXV that should be con-
sidered serious and potentially fatal. The risk to the per-
sons and the risk for the spread of the disease to others
made MPXV infection a potentially serious public health
matter.
The probability that any surviving animal directly
involved in the outbreak may be infected must be consid-
ered high, given the possibility of latent infection. Making
the unlikely assumption that all of these animals are still
alive, the group includes the 178 African rodents, mostly
dormice, lost to follow-up, 107 prairie dogs from IL-1 that
were not traceable, and 50 nonrodent animals included in
the African shipment. An unknown number, but clearly
most, of the affected African rodents and IL-1 prairie dogs
that were traced and identified as alive as of July 2003
(121 African rodents and ≈93 prairie dogs) have since died
or been euthanized.
Some animals from other species that were in the
affected pet distribution facilities during the outbreak test-
ed positive for MPXV. An unknown number of these
exposed animals are likely to be alive and in private or
commercial ownership; what proportion of these animals
is infected with MPXV is unknown but is assumed to be
small. No confirmed cases of human infection or further
cases of animal infection have been associated with these
animals. However, all animals directly associated with the
2003 outbreak should be considered to pose a continued
high risk for infection.
The probability of infection in rodents or other animals
imported from monkeypox-endemic regions is unknown.
Imported African rodents were almost certainly the source
of the US outbreak. Animals imported as pets are handled
by several persons as they pass from importer to owner,
and they may be housed and transported in close proximi-
ty with nonimported susceptible animals. Current import
restrictions on African rodents substantially reduce the risk
for introduction and spread of MPXV, but a potential resid-
ual risk remains because of illegal importation as well as
import of nonrestricted species that may carry the virus.
Some previously imported animals from restricted species
might also be infected with MPXV, although this risk is
unknown and assumed to be extremely low.
For domestically bred African rodents, the risk they
may pose of transmitting MPXVto humans depends on the
risk that the rodents will be exposed to infected animals.
Absent a tracking or pedigree system that distinguishes
domestically bred from imported, wild-caught animals is
impossible. Trade in domestically bred African rodents
could increase the risk for human infection if illegally
imported infected animals are identified as captive-bred.
The monkeypox risk to humans posed by prairie dogs is a
function of the animals’possible contact with infected ani-
mals and their potential for viral transmission.
The number of animals infected with or exposed to
MPXV in the outbreak that might still be alive is likely
small. However, these animals may be widely distributed
geographically, and they may have spread the virus to
other animals not currently known to pose a risk. The risk
for MPXV infection and spread among prairie dogs are
mitigated by current import and trade restrictions and the
death or euthanization of most animals directly associated
with the outbreak. The probability that an uninfected
prairie dog will come into contact with an infected captive
or released animal and that there will be sufficient expo-
sure for infection is likely low. If such contact occurs,
however, these animals are highly susceptible.
Little evidence about the MPXV status of wild prairie
dogs exists. Given the high rates of illness and death
among captive prairie dogs exposed to MPXV in 2003,
anticipating that the virus would result in a die-off that
would be detected may be reasonable; however, in addition
to the lack of data, uncertainties about the virus and the
susceptibility of the animals in the wild preclude drawing
any conclusions.
The risk for new domestically acquired human cases is
low with the current restrictions on import and trade in cer-
tain species in place. No new cases have been reported in
humans or animals since the outbreak, despite the likeli-
hood that some surviving infected animals have been kept
alive by individual or commercial owners. Limited surveil-
lance efforts have not identified MPXV in wild animal
populations; however, the virus could possibly become
enzootic here if an infected animal were released or
escaped into the wild and spread the virus to susceptible
mammals. Were that to occur, human cases would likely
result. The risk that monkeypox could become enzootic is
relevant in evaluating the risk of importing potential mam-
malian carriers of MPXV or in allowing contact between
likely carriers and susceptible domestic mammals.
Data limitations preclude quantitative, and limit accu-
rate qualitative, estimation of the human risk for monkey-
pox in the United States (Table 3). Research is needed on
disease dynamics, range of host species, and the parame-
ters of wild animal trade and ownership.
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